1541, 6 L.Ed.2d 948, repeated or extended interrogation, Chambers v. State of Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 60 S.Ct. The U.S. Supreme Court then ruled in 1967's Garrity v. New Jersey that the employees’ statements, made under threat of termination, were compelled by the state in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. This constitutes coercion and violates the Fourteenth Amendment Right due process clause as well as Fifth Amendment protection against self-incrimination. ^3 The late Judge Jerome Frank thus once noted, in the course of a spirited defense of the privilege, that it would be entirely permissible to discharge police officers who decline, on grounds of the privilege, to disclose information pertinent to their public responsibilities. Mar 21, 1966. The case involved a group of New Jersey police officers accused of “ticket fixing” in local municipal courts. Appellants, police officers in certain New Jersey boroughs, were questioned during the course of a state investigation concerning alleged traffic ticket "fixing." If you make a disclosure with knowledge of this right or privilege, voluntarily, you thereby waive that right or privilege in relation to any other questions which I might put to you relevant to such disclosure in this investigation. Co. v. Kansas, 216 U.S. 1. 'The privilege against self-incrimination would be reduced to a hollow mockery if its exercise could be taken as equivalent either to a confession of guilt or a conclusive presumption of perjury. These conclusions are fully substantiated by the record. "You do have, under our law, as you probably know, a privilege to refuse to make any disclosure which may tend to incriminate you. 1287, 2 L.Ed.2d 1448, length and illegality of detention under state law, Haynes v. State of Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 83 S.Ct. Subtle pressures (Leyra v. Denno, 347 U.S. 556; Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503) may be as telling as coarse and vulgar ones. The choice given petitioners was either to forfeit their jobs or to incriminate themselves.  It gave birth to the Garrity warning, which is administered by investigators to suspects in internal and administrative investigations in a similar manner as the Miranda warning is administered to suspects in criminal investigations. Service Comm., supra, in speaking of a certificate exacted under protest and in violation of the Commerce Clause, said: Where the choice is "between the rock and the whirlpool," duress is inherent in deciding to "waive" one or the other. For the reasons stated above, I cannot agree that these statements were involuntary in fact.  As such, it does not minimize or endanger the petitioners' constitutional privilege against self-incrimination.  But the New *496 Jersey Supreme Court refused to reach that question (44 N. J., at 223, 207 A.2d, at 697), deeming the voluntariness of the statements as the only issue presented. In June 1961, the New Jersey Supreme Court directed the state Attorney General to investigate reports of "ticket fixing" in the townships of Bellmawr and Barrington.  Stevens v. Marks, 383 U.S. 234, 243, quoting from Frost Trucking Co. v. Railroad Comm'n, 271 U.S. 583, 593. Another defendant below, Mrs. Naglee, the clerk of … We are, however, informed that the three Barrington petitioners had counsel present as their depositions were taken. An assessment of the voluntariness of the various statements in issue here requires a more comprehensive examination of the pertinent circumstances than the majority has undertaken. The majority employs a curious mixture of doctrines to invalidate these convictions, and I confess to difficulty in perceiving the intended relationships among the various segments of its opinion. They claim that they had a constitutional right to refuse to answer under the circumstances, but . It would be difficult to imagine interrogations to which these criteria of duress were more completely inapplicable, or in which the requirements which have subsequently been imposed by this Court on police questioning were more thoroughly satisfied. They were also not under arrest therefore they weren't guaranteed Miranda Rights. Garrity v. New Jersey 385 U.S. 493 (1967) Case Text. It is inadmissible, even if voluntarily offered. Id., at 634-635. Media. The majority opinion, written by Douglas, found that the officers were compelled to testify against themselves under threat of removal from office. Another defendant below, Mrs. Naglee, the clerk of Bellmawr's municipal court, has since died. . I think it manifest that, under the standards developed by this Court to assess voluntariness, there is no basis for saying that any of these statements were made involuntarily. All the petitioners were cautioned that they were entitled to remain silent, and there was no evidence whatever of physical or mental coercion. 530.]. Id., at 557-558, 76 S.Ct. 13 . Therefore, because the employees’ statements were compelled, it was unconstitutional to use the statements in a prosecution. It must be concluded, therefore, that the sanction at issue here is reasonably calculated to serve the most basic interests of the citizens of New Jersey. The majority's broad prohibition, on the other hand, extends the scope of the privilege beyond its essential purposes, and seriously hampers the protection of other important values. The petitioners were convicted in two separate trials of conspiracy to obstruct the proper administration of the state motor traffic laws, the cases being now consolidated for purposes of our review. 105). It doesn't mean, however, you can't exercise the right. The criteria employed have included threats of imminent danger, Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560, physical deprivations, Reck v. Pate, 367 U.S. 433, repeated or extended interrogation, Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, limits on access to counsel or friends, Crooker v. California, 357 U.S. 433, length and illegality of detention under state law, Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, individual weakness or incapacity, Lynumn v. Illinois, 372 U.S. 528, and the adequacy of warnings of constitutional rights, Davis v. North Carolina, 384 U.S. 737. If both the consequence and the warning are constitutionally permissible, a witness is obliged, in order to prevent the use of his statements against him in a criminal prosecution, to prove under the standards established since Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, that as a matter of fact the statements were involuntarily made.
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